wip: fixing baseline role
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					 61 changed files with 58 additions and 974 deletions
				
			
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| 
 | ||||
| # https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl | ||||
| dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://access.redhat.com/solutions/1985633 | ||||
| # Seems dangerous. | ||||
| # Roseta need this though, so if you use it change it to 1. | ||||
| fs.binfmt_misc.status = 0 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl-userspace | ||||
| # Enable fs.protected sysctls. | ||||
| fs.protected_regular = 2 | ||||
| fs.protected_fifos = 2 | ||||
| fs.protected_symlinks = 1 | ||||
| fs.protected_hardlinks = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#core-dumps | ||||
| # Disable coredumps. | ||||
| # For additional safety, disable coredumps using ulimit and systemd too. | ||||
| kernel.core_pattern=|/bin/false | ||||
| fs.suid_dumpable = 0 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Restrict dmesg to CAP_SYS_LOG. | ||||
| # https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | ||||
| kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | ||||
| # https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl-kernel | ||||
| # https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Bug_Classes/Kernel_pointer_leak | ||||
| # Restrict access to /proc. | ||||
| kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Not needed, I don't do livepatching and reboot regularly. | ||||
| # On a workstation, this shouldn't be used at all. Don't live patch, just reboot. | ||||
| kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl | ||||
| # Basically, restrict eBPF to CAP_BPF. | ||||
| kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1 | ||||
| net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Needed for Flatpak and Bubblewrap. | ||||
| kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Disable ptrace. Not needed on workstations. | ||||
| kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 3 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl | ||||
| # Restrict performance events from unprivileged users as much as possible. | ||||
| # We are using 4 here, since Ubuntu supports such a level. | ||||
| # Official Linux kernel documentation only says >= so it probably will work. | ||||
| kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 4 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Disable io_uring | ||||
| # https://docs.kernel.org/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.html#io-uring-disabled | ||||
| # https://security.googleblog.com/2023/06/learnings-from-kctf-vrps-42-linux.html | ||||
| # Note that this will make using Proxmox extremely annoying though, so you might wanna comment this out | ||||
| # on a Proxmox node. | ||||
| kernel.io_uring_disabled = 2 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl-kernel | ||||
| # Disable sysrq. | ||||
| kernel.sysrq = 0 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/red_hat_enterprise_linux_6/2020-09-03/finding/V-217911 | ||||
| # Not running a router here, so no redirects. | ||||
| net.ipv4.conf.*.send_redirects = 0 | ||||
| net.ipv4.conf.*.accept_redirects = 0 | ||||
| net.ipv6.conf.*.accept_redirects = 0 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Check if the source of the IP address is reachable through the same interface it came in | ||||
| # Basic IP spoofing mitigation. | ||||
| net.ipv4.conf.*.rp_filter = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Do not respond to ICMP. | ||||
| net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all = 1 | ||||
| net.ipv6.icmp.echo_ignore_all = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Ignore Bogus ICMP responses. | ||||
| net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Enable IP Forwarding. | ||||
| # Needed for VM networking and whatnot. | ||||
| net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1 | ||||
| net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/red_hat_enterprise_linux_6/2016-06-05/finding/V-38537 | ||||
| # Ignore bogus icmp response. | ||||
| net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Protection against time-wait assasination attacks. | ||||
| net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Enable SYN cookies. | ||||
| # Basic SYN flood mitigation. | ||||
| net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1  | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://access.redhat.com/sites/default/files/attachments/20150325_network_performance_tuning.pdf | ||||
| # Make sure TCP timestamp is enabled. | ||||
| net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 1 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://access.redhat.com/sites/default/files/attachments/20150325_network_performance_tuning.pdf | ||||
| # Disable TCP SACK. | ||||
| # We have good networking :) | ||||
| net.ipv4.tcp_sack = 0 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # No SACK, therefore no Duplicated SACK. | ||||
| net.ipv4.tcp_dsack = 0 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # Improve ALSR effectiveness for mmap. | ||||
| vm.mmap_rnd_bits = 32 | ||||
| vm.mmap_rnd_compat_bits = 16 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| # https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl-kernel | ||||
| # Restrict userfaultfd to CAP_SYS_PTRACE. | ||||
| # https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/62780 | ||||
| # Interestingly enough, Arch does not even have userfaultfd in their kernel, so it is | ||||
| # probably not used in the real world at all. | ||||
| vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd = 0 | ||||
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